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NOTES
SEPARATION OF POWERS-THE
FEDERAL SENTENCING
COMMISSION:
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
DELEGATION AND THREAT
TO JUDICIAL IMPARTIALITY?
Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989).
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Mistretta v. United States,I the United States Supreme Court
held that the United States Sentencing Commission (the Commission) and the Sentencing Guidelines promulgated by it2 do not violate the constitutionally based doctrines of nondelegation of power
and separation of powers. 3 The Court applied the "intelligible principle" test for congressional delegations to conclude that the authority delegated by Congress to the Commission was sufficiently
detailed and specific to be constitutional. 4 The Court then approved Madison's view of a flexible separation of powers doctrine in
holding that neither the location, composition, nor presidential control of the Commission violated separation of powers principles.5
The dissent agreed with the majority that Congress prescribed
sufficiently detailed standards to meet the requirements of permissible delegation. 6 However, the dissent contended that the Commission violated the separation of powers doctrine because it exercised
1 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989).
2 The Sentencing Guidelines replace individualized sentences with defined sentencing ranges for all federal offenses and are binding on federaljudges. See infra notes 5867 and accompanying text for further discussion of the Commission and the Guidelines.
3 Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 675.
4 Id. at 654-55.
5 Id. at 658-75.
6 Id. at 677.
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legislative power. 7
This Note argues that the Commission and the Guidelines represent impermissible legislation, thus violating separation of powers
principles. In addition, the composition and placement of the Commission threaten judicial impartiality and independence.
II.

FACTS

On December 3, 1987, John M. Mistretta and Nancy L. Ruxlow
sold cocaine to an undercover federal narcotics agent.8 On December 10, 1987, a grand jury indicted them9 with conspiracy to distribute cocaine,' 0 knowingly and intentionally distributing and
causing to be distributed cocaine,"I and knowingly and willfully using a firearm in a drug trafficking crime. 12 Mistretta was sentenced
by the district court according to the Sentencing Guidelines.
Mistretta claimed that the Sentencing Guidelines were unconstitutional because Congress had violated the delegation of powers
doctrine by delegating one of its "core" legislative obligations to
the Sentencing Commission.' 3 He also asserted that the Guidelines
violated the separation of powers doctrine because only Congress
may prescribe sentences. ' 4 The United States District Court for the
Western District of Missouri rejected these claims, reasoning that
the Commission was an executive agency whose guidelines were like
the substantive rules of other executive agencies. 15 Furthermore,
members of the judiciary might serve constitutionally in the executive branch as Commissioners. 16 In addition, the Commission
should not have to sacrifice the input of judges to protect its
17
independence.
Mistretta pleaded guilty to the first count, conspiracy to possess
cocaine with intent to distribute, on February 3, 1988.18 The district
7 Id. at 680-83.
8 Petition for Certiorari by United States at 6, Mistretta (Nos. 87-1904, 87-7028).
9 The District Court did not enter any judgment on Ruxlow's Indictment. Brief for
Petitioner-Respondent United States at 13, Mistretta (Nos. 87-1904, 87-7028).
10 Distribution of cocaine is a felony. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1982). Conspiracy to
distribute cocaine is also a felony. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) (1982); 21 U.S.C. § 846
(1982).
11 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
12 Using a firearm to commit a felony is a felony. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1),(2) (1982).
13 United States v.Johnson, 682 F. Supp. 1033, 1034 (W.D. Mo. 1988).
14 Id.

15 Id. at 1034-35.
16 Id. at 1035.
17 Id.
18 Petition for Certiorari at 4, Mistretta (Nos. 87-1904, 87-7028); Brief for United
States at 14, Mistretta (Nos. 87-1904, 87-7028).
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court dismissed the second and third counts. 19 The parties stipulated to the factors the Court should consider in sentencing, resulting in a fifteen to twenty-one month range according to the
Guidelines. 20 The court sentenced Mistretta 2 ' to an eighteenmonth prison term followed by a three-year term of supervised release. 2 2 The district court also imposed a $1,000 fine and a $50 special assessment. 23 Mistretta appealed to the Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit.
Before the Court of Appeals heard the appeal, both Mistretta
and the United States petitioned the United States Supreme Court
for certiorari. 24 The Court granted certiorari because of the strong
public importance of rational sentencing 2 5 and because of the disa-

greement among the district courts. 26 The Court addressed the
constitutionality of the United States Sentencing Commission and
the Guidelines promulgated by
III.
A.

it.27

BACKGROUND

THE DOCTRINE OF UNLAWFUL DELEGATION OF POWER

Article I of the Constitution states that "all legislative Powers
19 Johnson, 682 F. Supp. at 1035.
Brief for Respondent-Petitioner Mistretta at 1, Mistretta (Nos. 87-1904, 87-7028).
Before the court sentenced Mistretta, he moved to have the Guidelines invalidated
as a violation of due process because they interfered with a trial judge's sentencing discretion. Mistretta argued that the Guidelines prevented sentencing judges from considering relevant factors. The district court denied this motion, concluding that the
Guidelines allowed the court to consider all factors that could make a difference
favorable to the defendant. Brief for Respondent-Petitioner Mistretta at 5, Mistretta
(Nos. 87-1904, 87-7028). Mistretta did not renew this claim in the United States
Supreme Court. Brief for Petitioner-Respondent United States at 14 n.23, Mistretta
(Nos. 87-1904, 87-7028).
22 Mistretta v. United States, 109 S.Ct. 647, 654 (1989).
20
21

23 Id.
24 The

parties petitioned for certiorari pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1982), which
allows direct appeal to the Court from any court of the United States which holds a
congressional act unconstitutional in a civil action in which the United States is a party.
25 The United States noted that this decision "will affect a large percentage of all the
criminal cases that reach judgment in the federal system." Brief for Petitioner-Respondent United States at 15, Mistretta (Nos. 87-1904, 87-7028). The Guidelines will govern
sentencing for most felonies and misdemeanors committed on or after November 1,
1987, and ultimately would have been applied in approximately 40,000 cases every year.
Petition for Certiorari by United States at 9, Mistretta (Nos. 87-1904, 87-7028).
26 Mistretta, 109 S.Ct. at 654. The constitutionality of the Guidelines was challenged
in more than 400 cases, and the district courts were sharply divided on this issue. As of
May 11, 1988, 21 district courts had upheld the Guidelines and 29 had held them unconstitutional. Petition for Certiorari by United States at 9, Mistretta (Nos. 87-1904, 877028).
27 Mistretta, 109 S.Ct. at 649.
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.. shall be vested in a Congress of the United States .... ,28 As a
result, "it is a breach of the National fundamental law if Congress
gives up its legislative power and transfers it to the President, or to
the Judicial branch ... "29 Such delegation is unconstitutional because the legislature cannot transfer law-making power "for it being
but a delegated power from the people, they who have it cannot
pass it over to others." 3 0 Courts 1 and commentators3 2 have suggested that the nondelegation doctrine preserves congressional accountability. Despite the strong words of this doctrine, the Court
corsistently has permitted congressional delegations of authority3 3
4
as far back as 1813.3

The Court first laid down a standard for judging such congressional delegations inJ. W. Hampton,Jr. & Co. v. United States.35 Such
delegation of authority was constitutional if Congress legislated an
28 U.S.
29

CONST.

art. I,

§ 1.

J.W. Hampton,Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394,406 (1928) (upholding the

constitutionality of § 312(a) of the Tariff Act of 1922, which allowed the President to
change any duties authorized by the Act after investigation).
30 J. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT § 141 (C. Macpherson ed.
1980).
31 The nondelegation doctrine "ensures to the extent consistent with orderly governmental administration that important choices of social policy are made by Congress,
the branch... most responsive to the popular will." Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO
v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (invalidating OSHA's power to promulgate standard because it exceeded statutory authority); see also Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 626 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting in
part).
32 John Hart Ely has argued that "by refusing to legislate, our legislators [escape] the
sort of accountability that is crucial to the intelligible functioning of a democratic republic." J. H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST,A THEORY OFJUDICIAL REVIEW 131-33 (1980).

Similarly, Judge Skelly Wright has noted that when Congress cannot deal with a problem, "it passes some 'soft' statutes which throw the mess into the lap of an administrative agency... at the expense of democratic decisionmaking." Wright, Review: Beyond
DiscretionaryJustice, 81 YALE LJ. 575, 585-86 (1972).
33 In only two cases has the Court held a congressional delegation excessive and
unconstitutional. See infra notes 44-46 and accompanying text for discussion of these
cases.
34 Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382 (1813) (permissible for Congress to grant to the President power to declare by proclamation that either
Great Britain or France ceased violating neutral commerce with the United States, which
effectively revived sections of the expired non-intercourse act of 1809). In Field v.
Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 682, 691 (1892), the Court relied on BrigAurora to uphold a delegation of tariff-making power to the President. Writing for the majority, Justice Harlan
stated, "That Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the President is a principle
universally recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitution." Id. at 692. However, the Court held that the President's power to suspend tariff provisions favorable to a country was executive and not
legislative power. Id.
35 276 U.S. 394 (1928). See supra note 29 for discussion of this case.
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"intelligible principle" and directed delegatees to conform to it.36
The Court has since applied this "intelligible principle" standard to
uphold a wide range of delegations, even though some delegations
have been general and given the delegatee broad discretion. Such
constitutional delegations have included authority to fix prices 3 7 and
rates, 38 determine water rights, 39 and regulate broadcast licensing. 40 The Court upheld these delegations largely because of congressional inability to deal with technical, expert, or large fields. 4 t
Thus Congress had provided a general policy on which the delegatees had premised their authority. 42 The Court rationalized this
type of delegation as in the public interest. 4 3
36 Id. at 409. In Hampton, ChiefJustice Taft stated the often-cited principle that dele-

gations of legislative authority must be judged "according to common sense and the
inherent necessities of the governmental co-ordination." Id. at 406; see also, Industrial
Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 674 (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring) (citing Hampton, 276 U.S. at 406) (see supra note 31 for further discussion of
this case).
37 Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426 (1944) (upholding delegation to an administrator to set fair and equitable commodity prices that would effectuate purposes of
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942). In Yakus, the Court held that the Constitution
had not required Congress to complete the fact-finding required for its legislative action, but rather has compelled it to set legislative policy. Id. at 424; see also Sunshine
Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 397 (1940) (upholding delegation of power to Bituminous Coal Commission to establish maximum prices for coal).
38 Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. 591, 600 (1944) (upholding delegation of power to Federal Power Commission to determine just and reasonable
rates).
39 Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963) (upholding delegation of power to the
Secretary of the Interior to choose among water users and settle terms of contracts for
apportioning impounded waters because the vast water system required a single manager to function efficiently).
40 National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225-26 (1943) (upholding delegation of power to the Federal Communications Commission to regulate broadcast licensing as required by public interest, convenience, or necessity).
41 See supra notes 37-39 and infra note 42 for discussion of these cases.
42 Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 675
(Rehnquist, J., concurring) (invalidating OSHA's power to promulgate particular standard because it exceeded statutory authority). Justice Rehnquist further concurred:
[Decisions upholding congressional delegations of authority] have done so largely
on the theory that Congress may wish to exercise its authority in a particular field,
but because the field is sufficiently technical, the ground to be covered sufficiently
large, and the Members of Congress themselves not necessarily expert .

. . ,

the

most that may be asked ... is that Congress lay down the general policy and standards that animate the law.
Id. (Rehnquist, J. concurring); see also Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935)
(invalidating delegation of power to President to prohibit interstate transportation of
oil). Congress needed "flexibility and practicality, which will enable it to perform its
function in laying down policies and establishing standards, while leaving to selected
instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules within prescribed limits." Id. at 421.
43 See, e.g., Sunshine Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 397 (1940) (Bituminous Coal
Commission's setting of maximum coal prices was constitutional "when in the public
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The Court invalidated only two congressional delegations of
power for Congress' failure to articulate any policy or standard confining the discretion of the delegatees' authority. 44 In Panama Ref.
Co. v. United States, the Court struck down a section of the National
Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) because Congress had not declared
a policy, established a standard, or laid down a rule.4 5 Similarly, in
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, the Court invalidated another section of'the NIRA that had dispensed with administrative
46
procedure.
B.

SEPARATION OF POWERS

The Constitution vests legislative power in the Congress, 47 executive power in the President, 48 and judicial power in the Supreme
Court. 4 9 These grants establish a separation of governmental powers. James Madison espoused that this separation of powers
guarded "against a gradual concentration of the several powers in
the same department." 50 The Court, asserting that the three
interest."); National BroadcastingCo., 319 U.S. at 225-26 (FTC's licensing of radio communication permitted as required by "public interest, convenience, or necessity").
44 PanamaRef., 293 U.S. at 388 (see supra note 42 and infra note 45 for discussions of
this case); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
45 Panama Ref., 293 U.S. at 415-20. Title I, § 9(c) of the NIRA gave the President
authority to prohibit transportation of petroleum in interstate commerce in excess of the
amount prescribed by state authority. Id. at 406 (citing National Industrial Recovery Act
of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 709(c)). The Court held that this section did not set a standard but
rather gave the President "unlimited authority" to determine policy. Id. at 415. The
Court enumerated a three-pronged test for deciding when a delegation had been excessive: 1) whether Congress had declared a policy with respect to that subject; 2) whether
Congress had set a standard for the President's action; and 3) whether Congress had
required any finding by the President in the exercise of the delegated judicial authority.
Id.
46 Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 533. The Court held that the NIRA was unconstitutional. Section 703 of the NIRA allowed the President to approve industry codes of fair
competition. Once approved, such codes were to "be the standards of fair competition
for such trade or industry." 15 U.S.C. § 703 (1933). The Court invalidated § 703's
code-making authority as an unconstitutional delegation. Schechter Poulty, 295 U.S. at
551. The Court distinguished previous decisions upholding seemingly equally vague
standards because, unlike this section of the NIRA, they included constraining procedures. Id. at 532-33.
47 U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 1.
48 U.S. Const. art. 2, 3,1.
49 U.S. Const. art. 3, § 1.
50 THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 349 (J. Madison) U. Cooke ed. 1961). Concentration of
powers should be prevented by "giving to those who administer each department, the
necessary constitutional means, and personal motives, to resist encroachments of the
others." Id.; see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 998 (1983) (purpose of separating
governmental authority is to prevent "unnecessary and dangerous concentration of
power in one branch").
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branches be largely but not totally separate, 5 1 uses the separation of
powers to safeguard against one branch's encroachment or aggrandizement at the expense of another. 5 2 This doctrine prevented the
exercise of arbitrary power by creating friction through distributing
53
the government's powers among three departments.
However, the Supreme Court has consistently followed the
Madisonian interest in a flexible separation of powers standard.
The doctrine does not imply that the branches cannot have "partial
agency in, or ...controul [sic] over the acts of each other," but rather
"that where the whole power of one department is exercised by the
same hands which possess the whole power of another department,
54
the fundamental principles of a free constitution, are subverted."
5
5
Thus, the three branches need not be totally distinct.
Applying this flexible approach, the Court has approved delegations that partially mixed branches' tasks but had not allowed one
branch to aggrandize another's power.5 6 The Court has, however,
57
struck down many delegations as violative of separation of powers
51 Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935) (each branch must
remain "entirely free from the control or coercive influence" of other branches) (emphasis
added); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976) (Congress could not reserve to itself
power to appoint members of the Federal Election Commission, a body exercising "executive" power; Constitution does not contemplate total separation of the three
branches); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974) ("In designing the structure
of our Government and dividing and allocating the sovereign power among three coequal branches, the Framers of the Constitution sought to provide a comprehensive
system, but the separate powers were not intended to operate with absolute
independence.").
52 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 120-22. See supra note 51 for discussion of this case.
53 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 629 (1952) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (citing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)).
54 THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 325-26 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (emphasis in
original).
55 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 121 (Constitution does not contemplate total separation of the
three branches of government); Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425,
442 n.5 (1977) (upholding delegation of power to the General Services Administration
to control presidential papers after resignation because the delegation did not prevent
the executive from achieving its constitutional functions); Youngstown Sheet & Tube, 343
U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring) (The Constitution "contemplates that practice will
integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its
branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity.").
56 See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 108 S.Ct. 2597 (1988) (upholding the judicial appointment of independent counsel because this appointment authority did not impermissibly interfere with the President's powers); CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986)
(upholding agency's assumption of jurisdiction over state-law counterclaims because it
involved narrow class of actions, the agency's power was restricted, and the agency was
subject to congressional review).
57 See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (congressional power of removal
over executive branch official violated separation of powers); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
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but only two as unlawful delegations of powers.
C.

THE SENTENCING COMMISSION AND THE GUIDELINES

In 1984, Congress created the United States Sentencing Commission as an independent body of the judiciary. 58 The Commission promulgates guidelines which determine sentences based on
criminal history and current offense and specify binding ranges for
prison terms. 59
The Commission consists of seven voting members appointed
by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. 60 At
least three of the members of the Commission must be federal
judges6 1 who may serve concurrently as judges and Commissioners. 6 2 The President may remove a Commission member "only for
neglect of duty or malfeasance in office" or if other good cause is
63
shown.
The Sentencing Guidelines should "provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing" while "avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records
who have been found guilty of similar conduct" and "maintaining
sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences." 64 The final
Sentencing Guidelines are a matrix defining a sentencing range for
every offense by using a scoring system in which points are added or
subtracted according to characteristics of the crime or of the
65
offender.
Although the Guidelines are binding on the courts, a sentencing judge may forgo the applicable guideline if he or she finds an
aggravating or mitigating factor that the Commission failed to consider adequately when formulating the guidelines. 6 6 The judge
919 (1983) (invalidating legislative veto); Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon
Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (separation of powers violated because Act conferred
Article III powers on bankruptcyjudges who did not qualify as Article IIIjudges because
they lacked lifetime tenure and salary protection).
58 Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (Supp. V 1987).
59 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1),(b) (Supp. V 1987). In addition, the Commission's proposed rules become effective if Congress fails to reject or modify them within six months
of their submission. 28 U.S.C. § 9 9 4 (p).
60 28 U.S.C. § 991(a).
61 28 U.S.C. § 991(a).
62 28 U.S.C. § 992(c).
63 28 U.S.C. § 991(a).
64 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B), 994(a)-(n).
65 For example, "Tax Evasion" receives a score of +4, while "Insider Trading" re-

ceives a score of +11.

UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS (1987).
66

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),(b) (Supp. V 1987).
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must then state a specific reason for imposing a sentence different
67
from the applicable guideline.
IV.
A.

SUPREME COURT OPINIONS

MAJORITY OPINION

In Mistretta, the Court held that Congress' delegation of the
power to formulate sentencing guidelines for federal criminal offenses to a Sentencing Commission did not violate the constitutional principles of nondelegation and separation of powers. 68 In
the majority opinion, 6 9 justice Blackmun stressed that Congress laid
70
down a sufficiently intelligible principle to guide the Commission.
Furthermore, the Commission's location in the judicial branch, its
judicial component, and its membership by presidential appoint7
ment did not violate the separation of powers principle. '
1.

Delegation of Power

Justice Blackmun used the "intelligible principle" test to determine whether or not congressional power delegations to and requests for assistance from different governmental branches survive
delegation of powers restrictions. 72 This test permitted congressional delegation of legislative power where Congress had first laid
down an intelligible principle to which the delegatee must conform. 73 The test's flexibility allowed Congress to function in an increasingly complex society. 74 Justice Blackmun noted that, with two

exceptions, 7 5 the Court has never invalidated a challenged statute
76
on delegation grounds.
Applying this "intelligible principle" test, the Court found that
Congress sufficiently had specified and detailed the Sentencing
Commission's authority. 7 7 Congress had provided the Commission
67

18 U.S.C. § 3553(c).

68 Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 675 (1989).
69 Justice Blackmun was joined by ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justices White, Marshall, Stevens, O'Connor, and Kennedy, and in all but n. I1 by Justice Brennan.
70 Id. at 654-58.
71 Id. at 658-75.
72 Id. at 654.
73 Id. (citingJ.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928)).
74 Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 654-55.
75 Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (invalidating NIRA's delegation of
power to President to prohibit interstate transportation of excess oil); A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (invalidating section of NIRA for
lack of administrative procedure). See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text for further discussion of these exceptions.

76 Mistrella, 109 S. Ct. at 655.
77 Id.
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with three specific goals and four clear purposesJ 8 It also had set
out that the Commission should develop guidelines to regulate
sentences 79 and had listed certain uses of sentencing ranges. 80 Congress also had formulated detailed instructions for establishing offense and offender categories. 8'
The Court acknowledged that although Congress had allowed
the Commission significant leeway in formulating the Guidelines,
the Commission might not establish policy. 82 However, it might
have decided the relative severity of crimes, determined which had
been punished too leniently or severely, and developed categories
of similar offenses. 83 Justice Blackmun, approving this magnitude of
discretion, relied upon Yakus v. United States 84 which had permitted
bodies with congressionally delegated power to find facts and draw
inferences where standards guide their actions and courts could determine whether or not congressional goals had been met. 8 5 Justice
Blackmun argued that Congress had more than met this standard by
delineating the Commission's policies, rules, and procedures and by
indicating methods for handling specific sentencing situations.8 6
Reinforcing the conclusion that the delegation of power was acceptable, he maintained that the development of detailed sentencing
guidelines for hundreds of crime and offender classifications had necessitated a complex fact-finding effort for which an expert body was
87
particularly well-suited.
78 Id. Congress stated that the Commission's goals should be 1) to "assure the meeting of the purposes of sentencing as set forth" in the Act, 2) to "provide certainty and
fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records ... while maintaining sufficient flexibility
to permit individualized sentences," where appropriate, and 3) to "reflect to the extent
practicable, advancement in knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the criminal
process." 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1) (Supp. V 1987). Congress specified the Commission's
four purposes as 1) "to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the
law, and to provide just punishment for the offense," 2) "to afford adequate deterrence
to criminal conduct," 3) "to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant,"
and 4) "to provide the defendant with needed ... correctional treatment." 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(2) (Supp. V 1987).
79 Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 656 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)).

80 Id.

Id. at 656-57.
Id. at 657-58.
83 Id. at 657.

81
82

84

321 U.S. 414 (1944).

85 Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 658.
86 Id. (citing United States v. Chambless, 680 F. Supp. 793, 796 (E.D. La. 1988)
(Congress constitutionally delegated to the Commission authority to set criminal penalties by providing it with explicit instructions regarding formulation of the Guidelines,
creating congressional policies reflected in the statute, and circumscribing power to the
Commission by providing specific rules for certain situations).
87 Id.
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Separationof Powers

The Court held that the Guidelines did not violate the separation of powers doctrine. Justice Blackmun reviewed the fundamental principles of the doctrine to validate the constitutionality of the
Sentencing Commission as part of the judicial branch. He stressed
the Court's traditional adherence to the Madisonian view that the
three branches of government were separate yet interdependent.8 8
The Court explained that the purpose of separation of powers was
not to compartmentalize rigidly each branch but rather to prevent
" 'the encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other.' "89 In applying these principles, the Court has
held as unconstitutional statutes which had empowered one branch
with authority appropriately spread among all three or which had
threatened one branch's authority. 90 However, Justice Blackmun
noted the Court has upheld statutes which had mixed the functions
of the branches but had "pose[d] no danger of either aggrandizement or encroachment.- 9 1 Furthermore, Congress might have delegated to the judiciary nonadjudicatory functions that had not
threatened the authority of another branch and had been "appropriate to the central mission of the Judiciary. ' 9 2 The Court held that
concerns over the distribution of power among the branches raised
by the Commission's responsibilities and composition were consti93
tutionally unpersuasive reasons to require its invalidation.
In examining these responsibilities and composition, the Majority held that the Commission's location within the judicial branch
did not violate separation of powers. 94 Justice Blackmun noted that
although judges appointed through Article III of the Constitution
might not serve concurrently in executive or administrative positions, 95 the Court has "recognized significant exceptions to this general rule and.., approved the assumption of some nonadjudicatory
activities by the Judicial Branch."' 96 Examples of such included the
88 Id. at 658-59.
89 Id. at 659 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424

U.S. 1, 122 (1976) (seesupra note 51 for
discussion of Buckley)).
90 Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 659-60.
91 Id. at 660 (citing Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988) (upholding the judicial
appointment of independent counsel because appointment authority did not impermissibly interfere with the President's powers); CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986) (upholding delegation ofjurisdiction to CFTC for common law counterclaims)).
92 Id. at 663.
93 Id. at 661.
94 Id. at 664.
95 Id. at 661 (citing Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2612) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 123 (1976)).
96 Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 661.
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Court's power to promulgate federal rules of civil procedure 9 7 and
the judicial branch's power to administer the business of courts
through judicial councils. 98 Because these extrajudicial activities
and organizations relate closely to the judiciary's responsibilities,
the judiciary was the appropriate branch for their administration. 99
The majority thus justified that the Sentencing Commission's
placement within the judicial branch complied with separation of
powers principles. 10 0 Justice Blackmun noted that judges have
played primary roles in sentencing.10 1 Furthermore, like the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Sentencing Guidelines bound
judges and courts in exercising their powers.10 2 Although the development of sentencing guidelines required more political judgment than the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 0 3 Justice Blackmun
observed that the Guidelines did not engender too much political
activity.1 04 They did not govern public behavior or afford the judiciary with legislative authority to establish penalties for every
crime.10 5 The majority also noted that the Commission was fully
accountable to Congress, subject to the President's limited removal
powers, and beholden to the notice and comment requirements of
the Administrative Procedure Act.' 0 6 It was neither a court nor
some other type of body able to exercise judicial power. 10 7 Thus,
the Commission's position within the judicial branch did not enhance its power or threaten another branch's authority.' 0 8
The Court also ruled that Congress' requirement that the Commission be partly composed of federal judges who would share their
authority with non-judges did not interfere impermissibly with the
judiciary's functioning. 10 9 Active federal judges might constitutionally serve on commissions. 1' In United States 'v. Ferreira"' and
97

Id. at 662 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1

(1941)).

98 Id. at 663 (citing Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74, 86 n.7 (1970)). Other
examples ofjudicial administration of the courts cited by the Court include the Judicial
Conference of the United States and the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts. Id.
99 Id. at 664.

Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 665.
104 Id. at 667.
100

105 Id.
106
107
108

Id. at 665-66.
Id.
Id. at 666-67.

109 Id. at 667.

110 Id. The Court noted that while the "Constitution does include an Incompatibility
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Hayburn's Case,112 the Court generally had agreed that although
neither courts nor judges acting as part of a court could have assumed administrative duties, individual judges acting as commissioners could have accepted such tasks.1 1 3 The Court noted that
"judges serve on the Sentencing Commission not pursuant to their
status and authority as Article III judges," but solely because the
114
statute requires the President to appoint such judges.
The Court then rejected Mistretta's claims that mandatory service ofjudges on the Commission would have weakened the judiciary and that policymaking by Article III judges would have
threatened judicial impartiality. 1 5 The Court noted that no judge
had been appointed to the Commission against his or her consent
and that the President most likely had lacked authority to force an
unconsented appointment. 1 6 In addition, Justice Blackmun maintained that federal judges' participation in the development of the
Sentencing Guidelines had not affected their or other judges' impar7
tiality on sentencing issues.1
The Court struggled with the petitioner's claim that the judiciary's encroachment in the political development of the Sentencing
Guidelines weakened public confidence in judicial impartiality. "8
The Court stressed that the judicial branch had drawn legitimacy
from its "reputation for impartiality and nonpartisanship."'' t9 Justice Blackmun concluded that the participation of judges in the
Commission had left undisturbed this appearance. 120 The task of
the Commission was to develop rational guidelines for a process
performed exclusively by the judicial branch. 12 1 Therefore, signifi12 2
cant judicial participation in the Commission was appropriate.
Lastly, the Court maintained that the President's power to apClause applicable to national legislators . . .[n]o comparable restriction applies to
judges." Id. at 668 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl.2).
111 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40 (1852).
112 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 409 (1792).
113 Mistretta, 109 S.Ct. at 671 (citing Feneira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) at 40; Hayburn's Case, 2
U.S. (2 Dall.) at 409).
114 Id. at 671.
115 Id. at 671-72.
116 Id. at 672.
117 Id. (citing Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438 (1946) (Court's
promulgation of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did not foreclose its consideration of
challenges to their validity)).
118 Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 672.
119 Id. at 672-73.
120 Id. at 673.
121 Id.
122 Id.
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point and remove Commission members 123 had not precluded
judges from their constitutional duty to adjudicate fairly cases and
controversies.1 24 Justice Blackmun noted that the President could
have "elevate[d] federal judges from one level to another or ...
tempt[ed] judges away from the bench with Executive Branch positions."' 12 5 Presidential removal of a judge from the Commission
would not have threatened his or her status as an Article III
judge. 126 Moreover, Congress had specified that the President
might remove Commission members only for good cause. 127 Thus,
the Court held that the presidential appointment and removal powers had not compromised the impartiality of judges on the
t28
Commission.
In sum, the Court held that the Commission's composition, its
placement in the judicial branch, and its presidential authority over
its members' appointments and removals did not violate the separation of powers doctrine.
B.

DISSENTING OPINION

In his dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia agreed with the majority that the Commission complied with the "intelligible principle"
standard for delegation of power. 129 However, he rejected the "intelligible principle" standard as irrelevant to the decisiori because
the Sentencing Commission served a legislative function unrelated
to the exercise of judicial power. 130 Justice Scalia asserted that the
Commission's existence violated the separation of powers
3
doctrine. ' '
1.

Delegation of Power

Justice Scalia deemed the Guidelines as "legally binding prescriptions governing application of governmental power against private individuals . . . heavily laden . . .with value judgments and
policy assessments."' 1 2 He recognized that it is important for the
123 Id. The President may appoint all seven members of the Commission with the
advice and consent of the Senate and remove them "only for neglect of duty or malfeasance in office or for other good cause shown." Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (1982)).
124 Id. at 674-75.
125 Id. at 674.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 675.
129 Id. at 677 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
130 Id. at 679 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
131 Id. at 679-83 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
132 Id. at 676 (Scalia, J., dissenting). For example, under the Guidelines, a judge
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legislature to decide basic policy questions. 133 However, the dissent
argued that the judicial and executive branches also necessarily had
decided some basic policy questions. 13 4 Thus, the Court has upheld
all but two congressional delegations of power 3 5 based on a "public interest standard."' 13 6 Justice Scalia conceded that the Commission had sufficient congressional guidance and, therefore, did not
13 7
violate the doctrine of unconstitutional delegation.
2.

Separation of Powers

Justice Scalia rejected the majority's contention that the Guidelines complied with the separation of powers doctrine. 138 Because
the delegation of powers doctrine was so flexible that many congressional acts satisfied it, he urged that doctrines such as separation of
powers, which deter excessive delegation, must be rigorously enforced to rein in excessive delegation. 39 Justice Scalia reasoned
that most congressional delegations had been constitutional because the executive and judicial branches inherently possessed some
policymaking discretion, not because congressional burdens had necessitated delegation.140 He noted that the Court had upheld congressional delegation of discretion to administrate and execute laws
to other branches.14'
could have pronounced the same sentence for abusive sexual contact terrorizing a child
as for unlawfully entering or remaining in the United States. Similarly, the Guidelines
had permitted equivalent sentences for drug trafficking and violations of the Wild FreeRoaming Horses and Burros Act. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
133 Id. at 677 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

134 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
135 Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (NIRA's delegation of power to the
President to prohibit interstate transportation of excess oil violated the nondelegation
doctrine because it lacked a standard); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
295 U.S. 495 (1935) (invalidating section of NIRA because it lacked administrative procedures). See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text for further discussion of these
exceptions.
136 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
137 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
138 Id. at 683 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
139 Id. at 677-78 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
140 Id. at 678 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Applying this reasoning to the instant case, Justice Scalia argued that trial judges have the "power to determine what factors justify a
greater or lesser sentence within the statutorily prescribed limits because that was ancillary to their exercise of the judicial power of pronouncing sentence upon individual
defendants." Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
141 Id. at 678-79 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United
States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928) (Congress had frequently found it necessary to use
executive branch officers to make public regulations interpreting and executing statutes)
(see supra notes 29 and 36 for further discussion of Hampton); United States v. Grimaud,
220 U.S. 506 (1911) (upholding statutory grant of authority to Secretary of Agriculture
to make rules and regulations governing the use of public forests); Field v. Clark, 143
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Justice Scalia would forbid delegation of purely legislative
power without adequate standards.1 4 2 The Sentencing Commission
represented such an unconstitutional delegation. 143 Because the
Commission had no executive 144 or judicial 4 5 powers, he concluded that the majority's holding'allowed "rulemaking [to] be entirely unrelated to the exercise of judicial or executive powers,"
thereby allowing for endless congressional creation of independent
146
expert bodies.
The dissent, rejecting the majority's finding, maintained that
the Commission had not been part of the judicial branch. 147 He
bolstered his contention by reiterating the majority's reasoning that
the Commission was" 'not a court, does not exercise judicial power,
48
and is not controlled by or accountable to' the judicial branch."'
Justice Scalia also refused to characterize the Commission as an
"independent agency"' 14 9 because such agencies may not be part of
the legislative or judicial branches. 150 Because judicial power, unlike executive power, was not delegable, an independent agency
could not have purported to exercise power on behalf of a branch
where judges personally exercise the power.' 5 1 Justice Scalia rejected the trend of separation of powers cases, including the majority's holding, that viewed the Constitution as "a generalized
prescription" prohibiting excessive mixing of the branches and advocating case-by-case analyses. 152 Instead, he viewed the Constitution as a governmental framework which had already set the
boundaries of permissible mixing of the branches. 153 The ConstituU.S. 649 (1892) (authority to execute laws may be delegated while authority to make
laws may not) (see supra note 34 for further discussion of Field)).
142 Id. at 679 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
143 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
144 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia stated that the Commission had not been
located in the executive branch, had not exercised executive power on its own, and had
not been subject to the control of the President. Id.
145 Id. at 680 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
146 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
147 Id. at 681 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
148 Id. at 680-81 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 665).
149 Id. at 681 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
150 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
151 Id. at 682 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
152 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988) (see
supra note 56 for further discussion of Morrison); Young v. United States ax rel. Vuitton et
Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787 (1987) (United States Attorney's Office did not have exclusive
power to initiate contempt proceedings for disobedience to federal court orders; judiciary may also prosecute contempt because judiciary must have independent means to
vindicate its own authority without dependence on another branch to decide whether
proceedings should be initiated)).
153 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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tion thus had prohibited the "creation of a new branch altogether,"
a "junior-varsity Congress," or a "body which is not Congress, and
yet exercises no governmental powers except the making of rules
that have the effect of laws."' 15 4 Because the Commission violated
this framework, he concluded it was an unconstitutional violation of
separation of powers. 155
V.

ANALYSIS

Judicial participation in the Sentencing Commission and in the
promulgation of the Sentencing Guidelines violates the separation
of powers doctrine in at least two respects. First, the Guidelines
represent the judiciary's impermissible legislative action, because
precedent reveals that sentencing decisions are legislative in nature
and because the Commission's promulgation of the Guidelines violates general nondelegation principles. Second, judicial participation in the Commission threatens judicial autonomy and
impartiality. However, altering the Commission's responsibilities
and composition can meet separation of powers requirements while
retaining the benefits ofjudicial input to the Commission and to the
Guidelines.
A.

THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES VIOLATE SEPARATION OF POWERS
BECAUSE THEY ARE LEGISLATIVE

The Commission's promulgation of Sentencing Guidelines violates separation of powers because the Court has decided that sentencing decisions are legislative.' 5 6 Because thejudicial branch may
not legislate, 15 7 such promulgation is beyond judicial power. Also,
the Guidelines violate the basic test for permissible delegation, for
they contain "matter which is properly... regarded as legislative in
its character and effect."1 58 The majority failed to address whether
or not the delegated power was legislative. Although Justice Scalia
154 Id. at 683 (Scalia,J., dissenting).
155

Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).

156 Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 284 (1980) (any trend toward lighter, discretionary sentencing must come from the legislature); Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386,
393 (1958) (apportionments of punishments are questions of legislative policy); United
States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286, 297 (1957) ("power to make laws under which men
are punished for crimes call for.., the exercise of legislative judgment"); United States
v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483, 486 (1947) ("defining crimes and fixing penalties are legislative,
not judicial, functions"); Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 42 (1916) ("authority to
define and fix the punishment for crime is legislative").
157 Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923) judicial function is to interpret

and apply laws in cases properly brought before courts).
158 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952 (1983) (see supra note 50 for further discussion
of this case).
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referred to this issue to support his dissent, the legislative nature of
the Guidelines is even clearer than he described, thereby justifying
their unconstitutionality.
The Court consistently has defined sentencing decisions as legislative.' 5 9 Only Congress can define criminal offenses and prescribe punishments. 60 In addition, only legislation approved by
both Houses may limit federal judges' sentencing discretion. 1 6 1
The Guidelines prescribe punishments, are not promulgated by a
legislative act, and are not approved by the House of Representatives. Therefore, the Commission's promulgation of the Guidelines
violates separation of powers because they are beyond the scope of
judicial powers.
Alternatively, the Guidelines also violate separation of powers
because they fail the INS v. Chadha test for appropriate exercise of
legislative power. 16 2 They contain matter which is properly regarded as legislative in character and effect; actions are legislative in
character and effect when they "[alter] the legal rights, duties and
relations of persons." 163 Congress exclusively has the authority to
set basic policy decisions.' 64 The Guidelines contain basic moral
judgments about appropriate levels of punishment.' 65 Also, the
Commission's elaborate decision making process indicates that the
166
Guidelines were created through a distinctly legislative method.
159 See supra note 156 for these definitions.
Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 689 (1980) ("within our federal constitutional framework the legislative power, including the power to define criminal offenses
and to prescribe the punishments to be imposed upon those found guilty of them, resides wholly with the Congress"); see also Liman, The ConstitutionalInfirmities of the United
States Sentencing Commission, 96 YALE LJ. 1363, 1370 (1987) ("only Congress may decide
whether a person's liberty should be restricted").
161 United States v.Johnson, 682 F. Supp. 1033, 1037 (W.D. Mo. 1988) (Wright, CJ.,
dissenting) (see supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text for further discussion of this
case).
162 Chadhq, 462 U.S. at 952 (see supra note 50 for further discussion of this case).
160

163 Id.
164 Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 626 (1963) (important social policy choices

must be made by Congress).
165 The Guidelines' classification of offenses "reflects a sentencing philosophy."
Schwartz, Options in Constructinga SentencingSystem: Sentencing Guidelines Under Legislative or
Judicial Hegemony, 67 VA. L. REV. 637, 641 (1981). The Guidelines include particular
levels of punishment for particular offenses for the purpose of achieving certain goals of
deterrence and retribution. Id. at 643.
166 United States v. Estrada, 680 F. Supp. 1312, 1324 (D. Minn. 1988) (Sentencing
Commission violated separation of powers principles by having judiciary perform legislative function; the Commission's "extensive hearings, elaborate fact-finding processes,
and myriad policy decisions undertaken by the Commission in promulgating general
rules of future applicability... are clear evidence that the Commission has performed
the legislative function of prescribing the punishment for crime.").
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The Guidelines thus reflect legislative action because they constitute
sentencing decisions and involve basic policy judgments.
B.

THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE
THEY THREATEN JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND IMPARTIALITY

Contrary to the majority's analysis,1 6 7 judicial participation in
the Sentencing Commission is unconstitutional because it threatens
judicial impartiality 168 and independence.' 69 Although the majority
considered the impartiality issue under separation of powers principles, it may also be viewed as a separate, important policy reason for
invalidating the Guidelines. Impartiality is a central, constitutionally ordained requirement of federal judicial offices. 170 Litigants
trust in the judiciary's impartiality.' 7 1 Judicial involvement in the
promulgation of the Guidelines undermines both thejudiciary's impartial adjudication of particular cases and its reputation for impar172
tiality among litigants and the public.
167 The Eighth Circuit recently confirmed this view that judicial participation on the
Commission does not threaten the independence and impartiality of the judiciary.
United States v. Barnerd, 887 F.2d 841 (8th Cir. 1989).
168 In Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597, 2615 (1988), the Court held that judicial
power over the independent counsel did not threaten judicial impartiality because the

judges were "isolated ... from the review of the activities of the independent counsel."
Thus, Morrison is distinguishable from Mistretta, because judicial members of the Sentencing Commission are not isolated from the activities that threaten their impartiality.
169 ChiefJustice Taney found that if ajudge personally assumes a nonjudicial task, the
judge does not violate separation of powers. Slonim, ExtrajudicialActivities and the Principle of the Separation of Powers, 49 CONN. BJ. 391, 407 (1975) (citing United States v. Fer-

reira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40 (1852)). However, this analysis did not encompass the issue
ofjudicial impartiality.
170 United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200 (1980).
171 Hobson v. Hansen, 265 F. Supp. 902, 931 (D.D.C. 1967) (Wright, J., dissenting)
(upholding delegation of authority to district court to appoint members of the District of
Columbia Board of Education).
172 This Note will not analyze whether United States Supreme Court Justices should
participate in extrajudicial activities in general. This Note discusses the reasons judicial
participation in the Sentencing Commission threatens judicial impartiality. However, it
should be noted that the majority recognized that not "every kind of extrajudicial service under every circumstance necessarily accords with the Constitution ....

The ulti-

mate inquiry remains whether a particular extrajudicial assignment undermines the
integrity of the judicial Branch." Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 671 (1989).
For analyses arguing that Justices should not participate in any non-judicial activities,
see The Association and the Supreme Court, 32 A.B.A.J. 862, 862-63 (1946) (describing Jus-

tice Robert Jackson's personal view that Justices should not hold other government offices); Note, ExtrajudicialActivityof Supreme CourtJustices, 22 STAN. L. REV. 587, 589 (1970).
For arguments in favor of allowing extrajudicial activity byJustices, see United States v.
Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008, 1012 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc) ("considerable weight is to be
given to an unbroken practice, which has prevailed since the inception of our nation and
was acquiesced in by the Framers of the Constitution when they were participating in
public affairs"); Slonim, supra note 169, at 404, 406 (court as a whole cannot exercise
nonjudicial powers, but individual judges acting in personal capacity may do so).
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Judges cannot be impartial when they promulgate Sentencing
Guidelines which they will use in future cases. 173 The Guidelines
threaten the courts' independence because they "give a Justice a
stake in what persons outside the judiciary do or tie him to interests
which become involved in litigation before the Court..
-174 After
expending great effort in the formulation of the Guidelines, judges
who served on the Commission will more likely apply the Guidelines
dogmatically. The Guidelines cannot possibly anticipate every sentencing decision. Thus, the potential for strict application of the
Guidelines to these instances is alarming.
Just such a dilemma was exemplified by Judge Charles E. Clark,
principal drafter of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 17 5 After
drafting the rules, Judge Clark "heard hundreds of cases that required interpretation or application of the Federal Rules" as ajudge
for the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. 176 In cases involving the
Federal Rules, Clark's behavior was strongly influenced by his experience as scholar and draftsman of the Rules. His strong bias for the
Rules prompted his defense of the Rules against both constitutional
and Rules Enabling Act challenges, and precedents that he thought
construed the Rules incorrectly.' 7 7 Similarly, judicial participation
in the promulgation of the Guidelines will prevent judges from impartially adjudicating constitutional challenges to the Guidelines'
validity. 178 Judges who served on the Commission may be biased in
favor of viewpoints they advocated as Commission members and
173 The majority erroneously argued that federal judges' participation in the promulgation of the Guidelines does not affect their or other judges' ability to adjudicate sentencing issues impartially. Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 673. Conversely, "the mandatory
inclusion of Article III judges on the Commission compromises judicial neutrality by
charging judges with both the execution and the imposition of sentences in particular
cases." United States v. DiBiase, 687 F. Supp. 38, 44 (D. Conn. 1988) (Guidelines violate separation of powers).
174 Note, supra note 172, at 589.
175 Smith,Judge Charles E. Clark and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 YALE LJ. 914,
915 (1976). Throughout the development of the Rules of Civil Procedure, Judge Clark
held numerous key positions, including Reporter to the Supreme Court's Advisory
Committee on the Rules, to the Committee that oversaw the functioning of the Rules,
and to this Committee when it was later reconstituted as part of the Judicial Conference
of the United States. Judge Clark was largely responsible for these Committees' works,
which included revising the Rules. Id.
176 Id.
177 Id. at 951.
178 The majority argued that judges who had served on the Commission can impartially adjudicate constitutional challenges to the Guidelines. The majority supported
this argument by an analogy to Mississippi PublishingCorp., in which the Court held that its
promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did not foreclose its consideration
of challenges to their validity. Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 672 (1989)
(citing Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 444 (1946)).
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blind to potentially viable challenges. 79
A judge who helped to formulate the Guidelines is more likely
to try to interpret the Guidelines according to his or her own vision
of the Guidelines in an individual case, thereby slighting the unique
circumstances of the case. Again, the example of Judge Clark is
analogous. He viewed his decisions as opportunities to correct what
he saw as errors in the Rules. 180 Guidelines judges may also try to
correct errors they perceive in the Guidelines through their cases.
The Court's ability to decide constitutional questions regarding
civil procedure rules is not analogous to its ability to decide challenges to the Guidelines. The Court's power to promulgate civil
procedure rules is justified by its expertise of procedural rules and
its inherent procedural rulemaking role.' 8 ' These justifications are
inapplicable to sentencing. As noted above, the Court has emphasized repeatedly that determining sentencing ranges are legislative
dominion.' 8 2 Though courts may consider the advice and practices
of otherjudges when imposing sentences, setting sentence ranges is
not an inherent judicial function like the promulgation of court
rules. 18 3 Also, civil procedure rules provide for fair adjudication
rather than favoring one outcome over another.18 4 The Guidelines,
on the other hand, specifically set particular levels of punishment to
carry out particular goals of deterrence and retribution.
Moreover, judicial participation in the promulgation of the
Guidelines undermines the judiciary's reputation for impartiality.
The judiciary draws legitimacy from this reputation. 85 Judicial de179 Comment, Separation of Powers andJudicial Service on PresidentialCommissions, 53 U.
CH. L. REv. 993, 1011 (1986) ('Judicial service on presidential commissions may
threaten judicial impartiality because it could bias a judge in favor of viewpoints that he
or his colleagues promoted as members of a commission."); see also Note, supra note 172,
at 594 ('Justices who have advised ... on a 'correct' course of action will find it difficult
to strike down the action they recommended as illegal or unconstitutional if the action is
challenged in Court.").
180 Smith, supra note 175, at 951. Judge Clark's judicial opinions "befitted a judge
who had explored the subject thoroughly and was determined to see his conclusions
prevail." Id.
181 Liman, supra note 160, at 1387 (citing J. WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF COURT RULEMAKING PROCEDURES 54-55 (1977); Pound, The Rule-Making Power of the Courts, 12 A.B.A.
J. 599, 602 (1926)).
182 See supra notes 156 and 160 and accompanying text for cases and further discussion regarding the legislative nature of sentencing decisions.
183 See In re Judicial Admin.: Felony Sentencing Guidelines, 120 Wis. 2d 198, 353
N.W.2d 793 (1984) (recognizing this distinction in refusing legislatively granted authority to promulgate sentencing guidelines).
184 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 466-67 (1965) (in civil action where jurisdiction is
based on diversity, service of process shall be made as specified in Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4(d)(1) rather than in manner prescribed by state law).
185 Indeed, the majority recognized this point. Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct.
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cisions have only as much force as other branches and the public
accord them.' 8 6 One commentator suggests that the United States
Supreme Court draws popular support from the public's symbolic
association of the Constitution, a publicly revered document, with
the Court, its neutral arbiter. 18 7 Similarly, Justice Robert Jackson
observed that "'public opinion . . . seems always to sustain the
power of the Court ....
188 Thus, an activity such as the creation
of the Guidelines "that gives even the appearance of partiality... or
that in some other way harms the public image of the Court as the
neutral guardian of the Constitution, jeopardizes the Court's power
to persuade."' 8 9 Such a perception of bias by litigants and the public in general threatens the judiciary's ability to decide cases
effectively. 190
In addition, one judge's participation in promulgating the
Guidelines may influence another judge's view and application of
the Guidelines. Judicial Commission members stamp their constitutional approval on the Guidelines by creating and approving
them. 19 ' This judicial approval may influence other judges to favor
'

647, 672-73 (1989) (see supra note 119 and accompanying text for the majority's discussion of the importance of impartiality).
186 Note, supra note 172, at 588; see also Comment, supra note 179, at 1017 ("[N]ot
only must a judge in fact be independent and impartial in resolving disputes, but the
public must also perceive this to be the case") (emphasis in original) (citing H.T. RUBIN,
THE COURTS: FULCRUM OF THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 3 (2d ed. 1984) (the purpose of the
courts is not only to "do justice," but "to appearto do justice") (emphasis in original));
Hobson v. Hansen, 265 F. Supp. 902, 931 (D.D.C. 1967) (Wright, J., dissenting) (see
supra note 171 for further discussion of Hobson).
187 Lerner, Constitution and Court as Symbols, 46 YALE L.J. 1290, 1294 (1937); see also
Comment, supra note 179, at 1017 ("A court's effectiveness in applying the law to the
parties depends on its public image as a fair and neutral arbiter .... ").
188 E. GERHART, AMERICA'S ADVOCATE: ROBERT H. JACKSON 121 (1958).
189 Note, supra note 172, at 589; see also In re Application of the President's Comm'n on
Organized Crime, Subpoena of Scaduto, 763 F.2d 1191, 1197 (11th Cir. 1985) ("evenif
ajudge could satisfy himself that he could separate his participation on the Commission
from his judicial functions, it is not clear that litigants could sustain equal faith in his
impartiality").
190 United States v. Arnold, 678 F. Supp. 1463, 1472 (S.D. Cal. 1988) (Commission's
makeup violated separation of powers to the extent it included Article III judges as
members).
191 United States v. Tolbert, 682 F. Supp. 1517, 1527 (D. Kan. 1988) (composition of
Commission violated separation of powers) (citing Comment, supra note 179, at 1012-13
("A judge's part in the formation of that action may influence how otherjudges consider
and apply such enactments. By recommending a law, ajudge puts his stamp of approval
on it and in effect renders an opinion that it is constitutional or legal.")). Contra United
States v. Chambless, 680 F. Supp. 793, 800 (E.D. La. 1988) ("It is no secret that judges
disagree with each other constantly. In construing or applying the guidelines, federal
judges are unlikely to be impressed, or even minimally affected, by the fact that other
judges serve on the Sentencing Commission.") (see supra note 86 for further discussion
of this case).
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the Guidelines. Thus, service of three judges in such a Commission
is enough to threaten the loss of independence and impartiality to
92
the entire judiciary.1
The majority and commentators cite recusal as preventing judicial partiality.' 9 3 However, recusal does nothing to alleviate the effect the judge's service on the Commission has on the impartiality of
other judges.194 Also, "[g]iven the prevalence of guidelines issues,
the participating judges could be at risk of disqualification in nearly
every criminal case."' 9 5
Service by judges on the Commission thus creates the potential
that these judges will not decide future Guidelines-related cases impartially. Judicial promulgation of the Guidelines also damages the
public's perception of judicial impartiality and influences other
judges' acceptance of the Guidelines.
C.

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

Several solutions to correct and salvage the Commission and
the Guidelines exist. To prevent the Commission from unconstitutionally legislating, Congress could further limit the Commission's
policy judgments. Congress should make more of the basic decisions about which goals, such as retribution and punishment, to
favor in which cases.
In addition, to prevent judges who have served on the Commission from later presiding over cases governed by or challenging
constitutionally the Guidelines, Congress can either require that the
Commission's judicial members be retired judges or restrict these
members from deciding cases governed by the Guidelines while or
after serving on the Commission. However, as noted above, such
192 In In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1988), the Court of Appeals found
that a "Special Court" consisting of three federal judges to appoint and supervise an
independent counsel to investigate the actions of various government officials violated
separation of powers. "Intimate involvement of an Article II court in the supervision
and control of a prosecutorial office undermines the status of the judiciary as a neutral
forum." Id. at 516. In discussing this case, one of the district courts found that "service
by three federal judges on the Sentencing Commission even more severely undermines
the status of the judiciary and involves them even more intimately with the executive
branch." United States v. Estrada, 680 F. Supp. 1312, 1332 (D. Minn. 1988) (see supra
note 166 for further discussion of this case).
193 Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 672 (1989).
194 Tolbert, 682 F. Supp. at 1527; Estrada, 680 F. Supp. at 1335 ("given the interest in
staffing important commissions with knowledgeable and highly respected judges, commission appointees are likely to be those with the greatest potential to influence other
judges"); Comment, supra note 179, at 1013.

195 Estrada, 680 F. Supp. at 1335.
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wholesale restriction would still not prevent the effect a judicial
Commission member's views may have on a colleague.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The impermissible .delegation of legislative power and potential
weakening of judicial impartiality make the Guidelines unconstitutional. The Court has held sentencing decisions to be legislative because they encompass basic value judgments. Judicial
independence is threatened by giving judges a stake in nonjudicial
activities. Judicial impartiality is threatened by allowing judges who
serve on the Commission to decide cases related to the Guidelines.
Other judges who do not serve on the Commission may be influenced by the judicial members' stamp of approval on the Guidelines. Also, the potential solutions are drastic and undoubtedly
difficult for the individual judges involved, who may be required to
give up a large number of cases. However, these solutions will preserve the benefits of federal judicial input to sentencing decisions
while eradicating the separation of powers problems.
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